Introduction
This article examines the experienceofmunicipal and district healthcouncils in the city of SãoPaulo in the light of the literatureoncitizen participation in Brazil. The literaturehas attributed the success or failureofparticipatory mechanisms either to the degree of civil society involvement,or to the level of commitment to suchmechanisms on the part of the politicalauthorities.This begs the question of what happens wherebothfactors arepresent,but the participatory mechanisms nevertheless remain relatively ineffectualas institutions for promoting the interests of the excluded. Drawing on research intoparticipation in SãoPaulo' s healthcouncils, the article argues that the success of this type of participatory mechanismdepends not only on the involvement and commitment of civil society and stateactors,but alsoon their willingness and ability topromoteinstitutionalinnovations that guarantee clear rules of political representation and processes of discussion and decision making that lead to effectivep articipationby representatives who command less technicalk nowledge and fewer communicative resources.
Citizen participation in Brazil
Brazil has apopulation of about 170 million,of whom 22 million liveinconditions of extreme poverty.In this context, socialinequality is acrucial problem and socialpolicy plays animportant role. Expenditureon socialpolicy measures currently corresponds to 21p er cent of gross domestic product (GDP). However,despiteanincreasing supply of publiceducation,healthcareand social security, t hereh as not been a s ignificant improvement in the quality of the services provided. Nor is thereevidence that thesepolicy measures arecontributing toa reduction in socialexclusion (IPEA 2001) .
The 1988 Constitution,drafted during the redemocratisation process,attempted to solve these problems through acombination of universal social policies,decentralisation and mechanisms of citizen participation. Enabling legislation passed in the early 1990s toimplement theseprovisions led to changes in revenue sharing among the federal, state and municipal spheres of government.City governments were strengthened and began toplay ac entral r ole in t he promotion of citizen participationin socialpolicy management.
Thus in the 1990s, when there was anintense debateon the weaknesses of the welfare stateand agrowing emphasis on market-based solutions (Cornwall and Gaventa 2001) ,Brazil witnessed in the constitutional spherea reaffirmation of the central role of the stateinguaranteeing citizens' rights,in conjunction withaproposal toestablish analliancebetween the stateand civil society with the aim of overcoming the weaknesses identified.
In the caseofparticipation, this involved the creation of anextensivenetworkof socialpolicy management councils,each with responsibilities in formulating and managing policy for different areas suchas education,healthand welfare. These councils were set upat all levels,from local to federal,in accordance withaprinciple of parity between representatives of civil society (who occupy 50 per cent of the seats)on the one hand and on the other hand, representatives of government (25 per cent)and serviceproviders (25per cent). Thus, the councils are responsible not only for taking government projects to the population,but alsofor taking suggestions from the population to the various levels of government:municipal, stateand federal. Today thereare 28,000 socialmanagement councils throughout Brazil. Other forms of participation werecreated in the 1990s.Examples include participatory budgets,publichearings and mechanisms for participation in regulatory activities.
This article analyses aparticular type of management body: the healthcouncil. Brazil currently has 5,000 municipalhealthcouncils and more than100,000 people participatein them. Large cities alsohavedistrict healthcouncils.Health councils make decisions,act as consultativebodies and exerciseoversight.
1 They approveannualplans and healthbudgets.If the planis rejected, the city does not receivefunding from the HealthMinistry. They alsoassist municipalhealthdepartments with planning,establishing priorities and auditing accounts.Amajor proportion of the funds transferred by the FederalGovernment to municipalities is channelled through afund-tofund transfer system and the councils must verify theseaccounts and notify any irregularities.District healthcouncils have similar functions,but without decision-making powers, s ince t hey lacka Constitutionalmandate . It is important tonote that although their legalpowers reside mainly in the technicaland administrative spheres, the councils areespecially significant for their role in policy discussion (Mercadante 2000) .
Conclusions from the literature
The authors who haveanalysed theseexperiments in participation have r eached ambivalent conclusions,identifying grey areas withmany cases of relatively little achievement and afew successful cases.The relativefailures areattributed both to culturalfactors suchas authoritarian traditions in stateand society,lackof socialorganisation and resistance toparticipation by socialand stateactors (Sposatiand Lobo1992; Abrasco1993; Cohn et al. 1993; Carvalho 1995; Andrade 1998; Viana 1998; Carneiro 2002; Pozzoni 2002) . The successes areinterpreted as resulting from the organisation of civil society and/or the commitment of political authorities to the development of participatory mechanisms (Heller 2001; Boschi 1999; Abers 2001; Fung and Wright 2003; Marquetti 2003) . In sum, the view of theseauthors is that participatory mechanisms cannot beexpected to succeed if civil society is not organised and the politicalauthorities arenot committed todeveloping participation. The chances of success increaseinproportion to the commitment of theseactors top articipatory projects.But what is meant by success?
Thereis aheated debateabout what toexpect as a result of the development of participatory institutions.Participatory processes areexpected by many tocontribute toi ncreased levels of information and greater toleranceofdifference among the participants and tom ake decision making and management procedures more accountable. Where thereis less agreement is in relation to the expected impact of participatory mechanisms on wealthdistribution. The fact that, in the Braziliancontext,participation has been held upas anelement that is capable of counteracting distributivedistortions and contributing toan improvement in the quality of services,implies that the ability togeneratedistributiveimpacts should alsobe taken intoconsideration when evaluating the success of suchmechanisms.
Inorder for participatory institutions tohavean impact on servicequality or the equity of resource distribution,however, they must necessarily succeed in making adifference topublicdecision making. The rest of this article sets out toe xamine the organisation and functioning of healthcouncils in the city of SãoPaulo; to verify whether the conditions for success postulated by those who have studied the subject,organisation and commitment on the part of socialand stateactors werepresent there; and todiscuss the extent to which the councils effectively participated in healthpolicy.The purpose of this article is not toevaluate the effects on the participants themselves or the distributiveimpact of healthcouncils,b ut tof ocus specifically on investigating whether or not the councils havehad a voiceindecision making and why.
Healthcouncils in SãoPaulo
The city of SãoPaulo, whichhas apopulation of some 10.5 million,is conspicuous for sharp social inequality and unequalaccess topublic services (CEM 2002) . The Workers Party (PT)currently governs the city and alsohadanearlier period in power between 1988 and 1992.Inbothperiods it has prioritised citizen participation and the creation of publicpolicy management councils as ways of combating inequality.Shortly after taking power in January 2000, the PT administration subdivided the city into 31administrative regions and 41 health districts,each withits owndistrict healthcouncil. Thereis alsoamunicipalhealthcouncil for the entirecity (as well as the SãoPaulo StateHealth Council and the NationalHealthCouncil).
The population of the 41 healthdistricts created in 2000 varies from 180,908 to418,440.Muchas in other Latin American"mega-cities", the poorest areas arelocated on the outskirts.Wealthier areas, concentrated in the city centre, receivemorepublic healthcare services and have the largest numbers of hospitaladmissions.
2 Poorer areas,mostly outlying districts of the city,have the lowest levels of access tohealthcare. Among the exceptions is the district of SãoMateus, whichhas ahigh level of serviceprovision even though it is avery poor area.SãoMateus has ahistory of intense social mobilisation and struggle for better healthcare, suggesting that politicalparticipation cancontribute toimprovements in access topublic services . Severalparts of the city in addition to SãoMateus haveahistory of popular mobilisation, whichhelps toexplain the high level of engagement with the process by which the councils werecreated. A totalof40 district councils were set upin two years, witheachinvolving the mobilisation of over 1,000 people toparticipateinat least one monthly meeting; a s ignificant number,especially considering the limited financial resources available to support the process.
The municipalcouncil has 32 members and each district council has 16 members.Councillors' appointments arelinked to the institutions that nominated them. The government is represented by civil servants appointed by the MunicipalHealth Secretary orby the director of the healthdistrict. In the caseo f users and servicep roviders, the internalby-laws and rules of the council (drafted by the councillors)determine whichgroups are represented and how many seats areallocated to eachgroup (Mendes 2002; Moreira 2002) .
Despite the level of politicalcommitment to, and civil society engagement with, the establishment of the councils,ananalysis of the extent to which they influenced healthpolicy reveals almost no suchinfluence. The councils debated anumber of policies and problems in the healthcare system,but influenced neither major nor minor decisions of the city' s HealthDepartment (Coelho et al. 2003) . For example, twoof the most important municipal healthpolicies in the 2000-02 period, the creation of autarquias 3 and the scaling-backof the expansion of the Family HealthProgramme, 4 were simply announced by the city government without adequateconsultation of the councils, 5 despite promises from the municipaladministration that it would promotecitizen participation as one of its ten top priorities (SMS 2002) .
This lackofimpact raises the question of whether the politicalauthorities wereactually committed todeveloping participatory mechanisms or whether civil society was effectively organised. A review of datafrom the research suggests that the leaders of the process of decentralisation and creation of health councils werelinked to the sanitarista movement 6 whichfor more than 20 years has advocated the construction of apublic, universaland participatory health system. Of the civil society associations interviewed for this study and whichhad seats on the first councils set up,more thanhalf hadbeen established since the 1980s.Theseassociations focus on promoting politicalparticipation and keeping citizens informed,besides taking part in other forums suchas participatory budgeting and education councils.The profile of the stateand socialactors involved in the process and their success in creating the healthcouncils in the first place, suggests the problem was not alacko f commitment on their part.
This article argues that the realissue was the failureof theseactors toestablish the councils as dynamicpoliticalinstitutions.Thishypothesis is strengthened by analysis of the processes whereby the councils wereorganised and their members appointed and by observation of council meetings. The analysis presented hereclearly shows that what is missing is anadequatebalancebetween the need toguarantee the presenceofcivil society in newly organised councils and the need toestablishpolitical representation and decision-making processes suitable for institutions expected toparticipatein the formulation and oversight of healthpolicy. Achieving this balance,it is suggested here,depends on the ability and willingness of the socialand state actors involved topromoteinstitutionaldevelopment. Twoaspects of institutionald evelopment are critically important if participatory mechanisms are tofunction as politicalinstitutions.The first is, the questionof representation and the criteriafor organising political representation (not a simple question,given the fact that while the principle of one person,one v ote,is fundamental t o representativedemocracy),in this case weare dealing witha type of political representation that is designed tocomplement the state rather than substitutef or it.Thus it is necessary tof ind alternativef orms of representation capable of guaranteeing the presenceoforganised civil society or of groups traditionally excluded from access to public services.
Severalalternative w ays of organising representation in thesebodies havebeen described. One possibility,outlined by Schimitter (2001),is toidentify individuals and/or associations that represent groups in some way affected by the policy measures tobeimplemented. Inother experiences the goalis toorganise representation in sucha way as to(1) reproduce the socio-demographicprofile of the community; (2) represent the main positions in dispute; (3)make useofaffirmativeaction; or (4) offer structuralincentives for participation by low-income and low-status groups 7 (Fung 2003; Carpini et al. 2003) .
InSãoPaulo, the rules for civil society participationinhealthcouncils arebased on the segment of civil society that is represented. For example, the municipalcouncil has six seats for representatives of popular healthmovements,five seats for socialmovements, twofor labour unions, twofor people withchronicdiseases and one for disabled people. The problem is that this distribution of seats was decided by the councillors themselves when they drafted the internal rules for the council and reflect apre-existing networkof relationships among representatives of government and socialmovements (Coelho et al. 2003) . There is no clear rationale for the choiceof thesegroups or the number of seats allocated toeachone. The result is a set of "new included",groups of the "organised excluded" who havelinks with the state actors and set up the councils in the first place. Non-organised excluded and even organised groups who lack suchlinks remain unable toparticipate.
To the naturall imitation of this type of representation, whichis its inability toinclude all segments, wasadded the limitationderived from the way in whichit was decided who should act as representatives.Thereare widespreaddoubts about the legitimacy of these representatives,but these stem from the selection process rather thanfrom any lacko fbreadthi n the pool of potential representatives,given that the number of active civil associations in SãoPaulo runs into thousands. Nodoubt the cost of organising and publicising an electoralprocess involving amuchbroader range of associations would behigh. But it is acrucial issue,as without clear rules and a transparent electoralprocess, the councils will remain lacking in politicallegitimacy.
The second point is the organisation of procedures for discussion and decision making suited toaparticipatory arena.This is not at all easy todoeither, sincein thesearenas, thereis aprinciple of equality among all participants and they must be sufficiently independent of eachother for no one tobeable toimposea solution, yet at the same time sufficiently interdependent for everyone to loseif they are unable to reacha solution. Thus the councils operate under different dynamics from the state, wheredecisions are taken in accordance with a rigid hierarchy,or from business organisations, whosed ecisions arem arket-oriented. In participatory arenas,it is expected that decisions will be taken on the basis of aprocess of public discussion in which the best argument will prevail. This process of discussion canbeorganised in two ways (Carpini et al. 2003) . Consensus building is one, while the other emphasises the need to articulatedifferences and divergences by fomenting conflict.
In the meetings of both the municipalcouncil and various district councils studied during the course of this research,akey role was consistently played by the personalintervention of the executive secretary of the council and/or the chairperson of the session in organising the discussion. This results in the development of highly varied and unsystematic procedures, which rarely achieveanadequatebalance between the need to respect differences among councillors and ensure that everyone has achance to speakand the need too rganiseane ffective decision-making process.Achieving suchabalance is crucialifhealthpolicyis tobeinfluenced on the basis of adialogueamong socialgroups withclear asymmetries in communicative resources and levels of technicalexpertise (Fraser 1995; Pozzoni 2002; Carneiro 2002) .
Several techniques havebeen and arebeing developed toenhance the dynamics of participation and could be used in healthcouncils tomake the discussion and decision-making process more effective. They include the useofflexible rules so that all participants can take turns toact as coordinators and leaders.The involvement of trained facilitators tomake sureall participants express themselves could alsomake the process moreinclusiveand effective,as would the useof participatory methodologies for collective establishment of objectives and joint planning, implementation and evaluation of activities (Montoya 2002) . The formulation of anadequate agendais another point highlighted by several authors,given that some areas areinadequately discussed becauseof the high levels of expertise required for participation in the debate. Other areas of debatemake inadequate useof the potentialfor councillors toinformgovernment officials and politicians about their preferences and convey local knowledge,including the kind of details of the district best known to residents.This implies that ane ffort should bem ade top roduceac learer definition of the areas in which thereis most tobe gained from investing in participation (Fung 2003) .
Conclusions
The datacollected for this study suggest that the councillors who represent civil society haveless formal schooling and lower incomes than those who represent government and serviceproviders. The dataa lso show high levels of meeting attendance,especially by representatives of civil society.This creates a realopportunity for debate among socialg roups who otherwise would be unlikely tomeet todiscuss healthpolicy.However, the councillors themselves take anambiguous view of the experience. They arep leased with the opportunity toparticipate, yet they acknowledge that the discussions aredisorganised and that they havenot succeeded in organising themselves soas tocontribute to the development of solutions to the complex healthp roblems faced by the municipality and the districts.
Our findings suggest that the improvement of council' s participation in decision making depends on organising and publicising the electoralprocess as well as investing in methodologies and agendas that adequately respond t o t he s pecific characteristics and objectives of aparticipatory institution. But this entails ahigh cost.Under what conditions are socialand/or stateactors interested in bearing this cost?Although better knowledge of the actors'motivations is required toanswer this question,it seems reasonable toassume that more organised socialand politicalactors who aremore committed tocitizen participation aremorelikely tobe willing toassume the cost.Inany event,as the key actors behind the most visible experiments in popular participation in Brazil in generaland SãoPaulo in particular,it is up to them todecide whether or not toinvest in institutionaldevelopment as a solution to the problems whichhealthcouncils currently experience, whichareassociated with lacko fl egitimacy, the difficulty of promoting effectiveparticipationby the underprivileged and lacko fe ffectiveness in influencing policy formulation.
Inconclusion, this article has sought topresent anideaof the process that is unfolding in Brazil of building participatory institutions associated with the executivebrancho fg overnment.It is an impressivep rocess in terms of the numbers involved,becauseofits dynamismand becauseit contains some important promises,especially the possibility of opening uppublicpolicy formulation and management tocitizen participation as ameans of enabling excluded groups togain access topublic services and socialprogrammes.The results arenot always interpreted as satisfactory,partly because theremay sometimes beinsufficient organisation or motivation for participation tobeeffective. There aredifficulties even under favourable conditions, however.The reformers in the 1980s did not imagine that the cost of organising effective participatory institutions would be sohigh. The cost is high becauseparticipatory institutions must behaveas politicalinstitutions if they are tohave animpact on policy.Inother words, they need clear criteriafor deciding who will represent civil society and effectiveprocedures for discussion and decision making. This is the challenge:it is up to the stakeholders todecide whether they will bear the cost or let suchanimportant opportunity slip through their fingers. 5. Inbothcases the MunicipalHealthCouncil was consulted, but when it became clear that its position diverged from that of the HealthDepartment it was kept out of the decision-making process.
6.A sanitarista is apublichealthprofessional. Since the early 1980s, this movement haddefended profound healthpolicy reforms and was akey player in the creation of Sistema⁄nicodeSaúde (SUS),a universal,decentralised, tiered and participatory healthcare system.
7.These structuralincentives derivefrom the goods that canbeoffered by the participatory process,in the sense of results that will accrue to the community rather than individualbenefits.
8. It is also worthnoting that in fivecouncils studied, 75 per cent of the representatives of users were women and 78per centof the members of all fivecouncils wereover 50.Many were retired people. A totalof 20 of the 33 user representatives interviewed voted for and/or hadlinks with the Workers Party (PT)and three with the Communist Party of Brazil (PC do B). Ten of the 15 government representatives weremembers of the PT.
